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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* scm.c - Socket level control messages processing. * * Author: Alexey Kuznetsov, <kuznet@ms2.inr.ac.ru> * Alignment and value checking mods by Craig Metz */ #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/signal.h> #include <linux/capability.h> #include <linux/errno.h> #include <linux/sched.h> #include <linux/sched/user.h> #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/kernel.h> #include <linux/stat.h> #include <linux/socket.h> #include <linux/file.h> #include <linux/fcntl.h> #include <linux/net.h> #include <linux/interrupt.h> #include <linux/netdevice.h> #include <linux/security.h> #include <linux/pid_namespace.h> #include <linux/pid.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <linux/slab.h> #include <linux/errqueue.h> #include <linux/io_uring.h> #include <linux/uaccess.h> #include <net/protocol.h> #include <linux/skbuff.h> #include <net/sock.h> #include <net/compat.h> #include <net/scm.h> #include <net/cls_cgroup.h> /* * Only allow a user to send credentials, that they could set with * setu(g)id. */ static __inline__ int scm_check_creds(struct ucred *creds) { const struct cred *cred = current_cred(); kuid_t uid = make_kuid(cred->user_ns, creds->uid); kgid_t gid = make_kgid(cred->user_ns, creds->gid); if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid)) return -EINVAL; if ((creds->pid == task_tgid_vnr(current) || ns_capable(task_active_pid_ns(current)->user_ns, CAP_SYS_ADMIN)) && ((uid_eq(uid, cred->uid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->euid) || uid_eq(uid, cred->suid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETUID)) && ((gid_eq(gid, cred->gid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->egid) || gid_eq(gid, cred->sgid)) || ns_capable(cred->user_ns, CAP_SETGID))) { return 0; } return -EPERM; } static int scm_fp_copy(struct cmsghdr *cmsg, struct scm_fp_list **fplp) { int *fdp = (int*)CMSG_DATA(cmsg); struct scm_fp_list *fpl = *fplp; struct file **fpp; int i, num; num = (cmsg->cmsg_len - sizeof(struct cmsghdr))/sizeof(int); if (num <= 0) return 0; if (num > SCM_MAX_FD) return -EINVAL; if (!fpl) { fpl = kmalloc(sizeof(struct scm_fp_list), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (!fpl) return -ENOMEM; *fplp = fpl; fpl->count = 0; fpl->max = SCM_MAX_FD; fpl->user = NULL; } fpp = &fpl->fp[fpl->count]; if (fpl->count + num > fpl->max) return -EINVAL; /* * Verify the descriptors and increment the usage count. */ for (i=0; i< num; i++) { int fd = fdp[i]; struct file *file; if (fd < 0 || !(file = fget_raw(fd))) return -EBADF; /* don't allow io_uring files */ if (io_is_uring_fops(file)) { fput(file); return -EINVAL; } *fpp++ = file; fpl->count++; } if (!fpl->user) fpl->user = get_uid(current_user()); return num; } void __scm_destroy(struct scm_cookie *scm) { struct scm_fp_list *fpl = scm->fp; int i; if (fpl) { scm->fp = NULL; for (i=fpl->count-1; i>=0; i--) fput(fpl->fp[i]); free_uid(fpl->user); kfree(fpl); } } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_destroy); int __scm_send(struct socket *sock, struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *p) { const struct proto_ops *ops = READ_ONCE(sock->ops); struct cmsghdr *cmsg; int err; for_each_cmsghdr(cmsg, msg) { err = -EINVAL; /* Verify that cmsg_len is at least sizeof(struct cmsghdr) */ /* The first check was omitted in <= 2.2.5. The reasoning was that parser checks cmsg_len in any case, so that additional check would be work duplication. But if cmsg_level is not SOL_SOCKET, we do not check for too short ancillary data object at all! Oops. OK, let's add it... */ if (!CMSG_OK(msg, cmsg)) goto error; if (cmsg->cmsg_level != SOL_SOCKET) continue; switch (cmsg->cmsg_type) { case SCM_RIGHTS: if (!ops || ops->family != PF_UNIX) goto error; err=scm_fp_copy(cmsg, &p->fp); if (err<0) goto error; break; case SCM_CREDENTIALS: { struct ucred creds; kuid_t uid; kgid_t gid; if (cmsg->cmsg_len != CMSG_LEN(sizeof(struct ucred))) goto error; memcpy(&creds, CMSG_DATA(cmsg), sizeof(struct ucred)); err = scm_check_creds(&creds); if (err) goto error; p->creds.pid = creds.pid; if (!p->pid || pid_vnr(p->pid) != creds.pid) { struct pid *pid; err = -ESRCH; pid = find_get_pid(creds.pid); if (!pid) goto error; put_pid(p->pid); p->pid = pid; } err = -EINVAL; uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), creds.uid); gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), creds.gid); if (!uid_valid(uid) || !gid_valid(gid)) goto error; p->creds.uid = uid; p->creds.gid = gid; break; } default: goto error; } } if (p->fp && !p->fp->count) { kfree(p->fp); p->fp = NULL; } return 0; error: scm_destroy(p); return err; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(__scm_send); int put_cmsg(struct msghdr * msg, int level, int type, int len, void *data) { int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(len); if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) return put_cmsg_compat(msg, level, type, len, data); if (!msg->msg_control || msg->msg_controllen < sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) { msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC; return 0; /* XXX: return error? check spec. */ } if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen) { msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC; cmlen = msg->msg_controllen; } if (msg->msg_control_is_user) { struct cmsghdr __user *cm = msg->msg_control_user; check_object_size(data, cmlen - sizeof(*cm), true); if (!user_write_access_begin(cm, cmlen)) goto efault; unsafe_put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len, efault_end); unsafe_put_user(level, &cm->cmsg_level, efault_end); unsafe_put_user(type, &cm->cmsg_type, efault_end); unsafe_copy_to_user(CMSG_USER_DATA(cm), data, cmlen - sizeof(*cm), efault_end); user_write_access_end(); } else { struct cmsghdr *cm = msg->msg_control; cm->cmsg_level = level; cm->cmsg_type = type; cm->cmsg_len = cmlen; memcpy(CMSG_DATA(cm), data, cmlen - sizeof(*cm)); } cmlen = min(CMSG_SPACE(len), msg->msg_controllen); if (msg->msg_control_is_user) msg->msg_control_user += cmlen; else msg->msg_control += cmlen; msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; return 0; efault_end: user_write_access_end(); efault: return -EFAULT; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg); void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping64(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss_internal) { struct scm_timestamping64 tss; int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tss.ts); i++) { tss.ts[i].tv_sec = tss_internal->ts[i].tv_sec; tss.ts[i].tv_nsec = tss_internal->ts[i].tv_nsec; } put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMPING_NEW, sizeof(tss), &tss); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg_scm_timestamping64); void put_cmsg_scm_timestamping(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_timestamping_internal *tss_internal) { struct scm_timestamping tss; int i; for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(tss.ts); i++) { tss.ts[i].tv_sec = tss_internal->ts[i].tv_sec; tss.ts[i].tv_nsec = tss_internal->ts[i].tv_nsec; } put_cmsg(msg, SOL_SOCKET, SO_TIMESTAMPING_OLD, sizeof(tss), &tss); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(put_cmsg_scm_timestamping); static int scm_max_fds(struct msghdr *msg) { if (msg->msg_controllen <= sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) return 0; return (msg->msg_controllen - sizeof(struct cmsghdr)) / sizeof(int); } void scm_detach_fds(struct msghdr *msg, struct scm_cookie *scm) { struct cmsghdr __user *cm = (__force struct cmsghdr __user *)msg->msg_control_user; unsigned int o_flags = (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_CLOEXEC) ? O_CLOEXEC : 0; int fdmax = min_t(int, scm_max_fds(msg), scm->fp->count); int __user *cmsg_data = CMSG_USER_DATA(cm); int err = 0, i; /* no use for FD passing from kernel space callers */ if (WARN_ON_ONCE(!msg->msg_control_is_user)) return; if (msg->msg_flags & MSG_CMSG_COMPAT) { scm_detach_fds_compat(msg, scm); return; } for (i = 0; i < fdmax; i++) { err = receive_fd_user(scm->fp->fp[i], cmsg_data + i, o_flags); if (err < 0) break; } if (i > 0) { int cmlen = CMSG_LEN(i * sizeof(int)); err = put_user(SOL_SOCKET, &cm->cmsg_level); if (!err) err = put_user(SCM_RIGHTS, &cm->cmsg_type); if (!err) err = put_user(cmlen, &cm->cmsg_len); if (!err) { cmlen = CMSG_SPACE(i * sizeof(int)); if (msg->msg_controllen < cmlen) cmlen = msg->msg_controllen; msg->msg_control_user += cmlen; msg->msg_controllen -= cmlen; } } if (i < scm->fp->count || (scm->fp->count && fdmax <= 0)) msg->msg_flags |= MSG_CTRUNC; /* * All of the files that fit in the message have had their usage counts * incremented, so we just free the list. */ __scm_destroy(scm); } EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_detach_fds); struct scm_fp_list *scm_fp_dup(struct scm_fp_list *fpl) { struct scm_fp_list *new_fpl; int i; if (!fpl) return NULL; new_fpl = kmemdup(fpl, offsetof(struct scm_fp_list, fp[fpl->count]), GFP_KERNEL_ACCOUNT); if (new_fpl) { for (i = 0; i < fpl->count; i++) get_file(fpl->fp[i]); new_fpl->max = new_fpl->count; new_fpl->user = get_uid(fpl->user); } return new_fpl; } EXPORT_SYMBOL(scm_fp_dup); |