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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 | ========================= BPF Graph Data Structures ========================= This document describes implementation details of new-style "graph" data structures (linked_list, rbtree), with particular focus on the verifier's implementation of semantics specific to those data structures. Although no specific verifier code is referred to in this document, the document assumes that the reader has general knowledge of BPF verifier internals, BPF maps, and BPF program writing. Note that the intent of this document is to describe the current state of these graph data structures. **No guarantees** of stability for either semantics or APIs are made or implied here. .. contents:: :local: :depth: 2 Introduction ------------ The BPF map API has historically been the main way to expose data structures of various types for use within BPF programs. Some data structures fit naturally with the map API (HASH, ARRAY), others less so. Consequentially, programs interacting with the latter group of data structures can be hard to parse for kernel programmers without previous BPF experience. Luckily, some restrictions which necessitated the use of BPF map semantics are no longer relevant. With the introduction of kfuncs, kptrs, and the any-context BPF allocator, it is now possible to implement BPF data structures whose API and semantics more closely match those exposed to the rest of the kernel. Two such data structures - linked_list and rbtree - have many verification details in common. Because both have "root"s ("head" for linked_list) and "node"s, the verifier code and this document refer to common functionality as "graph_api", "graph_root", "graph_node", etc. Unless otherwise stated, examples and semantics below apply to both graph data structures. Unstable API ------------ Data structures implemented using the BPF map API have historically used BPF helper functions - either standard map API helpers like ``bpf_map_update_elem`` or map-specific helpers. The new-style graph data structures instead use kfuncs to define their manipulation helpers. Because there are no stability guarantees for kfuncs, the API and semantics for these data structures can be evolved in a way that breaks backwards compatibility if necessary. Root and node types for the new data structures are opaquely defined in the ``uapi/linux/bpf.h`` header. Locking ------- The new-style data structures are intrusive and are defined similarly to their vanilla kernel counterparts: .. code-block:: c struct node_data { long key; long data; struct bpf_rb_node node; }; struct bpf_spin_lock glock; struct bpf_rb_root groot __contains(node_data, node); The "root" type for both linked_list and rbtree expects to be in a map_value which also contains a ``bpf_spin_lock`` - in the above example both global variables are placed in a single-value arraymap. The verifier considers this spin_lock to be associated with the ``bpf_rb_root`` by virtue of both being in the same map_value and will enforce that the correct lock is held when verifying BPF programs that manipulate the tree. Since this lock checking happens at verification time, there is no runtime penalty. Non-owning references --------------------- **Motivation** Consider the following BPF code: .. code-block:: c struct node_data *n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n)); /* ACQUIRED */ bpf_spin_lock(&lock); bpf_rbtree_add(&tree, n); /* PASSED */ bpf_spin_unlock(&lock); From the verifier's perspective, the pointer ``n`` returned from ``bpf_obj_new`` has type ``PTR_TO_BTF_ID | MEM_ALLOC``, with a ``btf_id`` of ``struct node_data`` and a nonzero ``ref_obj_id``. Because it holds ``n``, the program has ownership of the pointee's (object pointed to by ``n``) lifetime. The BPF program must pass off ownership before exiting - either via ``bpf_obj_drop``, which ``free``'s the object, or by adding it to ``tree`` with ``bpf_rbtree_add``. (``ACQUIRED`` and ``PASSED`` comments in the example denote statements where "ownership is acquired" and "ownership is passed", respectively) What should the verifier do with ``n`` after ownership is passed off? If the object was ``free``'d with ``bpf_obj_drop`` the answer is obvious: the verifier should reject programs which attempt to access ``n`` after ``bpf_obj_drop`` as the object is no longer valid. The underlying memory may have been reused for some other allocation, unmapped, etc. When ownership is passed to ``tree`` via ``bpf_rbtree_add`` the answer is less obvious. The verifier could enforce the same semantics as for ``bpf_obj_drop``, but that would result in programs with useful, common coding patterns being rejected, e.g.: .. code-block:: c int x; struct node_data *n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n)); /* ACQUIRED */ bpf_spin_lock(&lock); bpf_rbtree_add(&tree, n); /* PASSED */ x = n->data; n->data = 42; bpf_spin_unlock(&lock); Both the read from and write to ``n->data`` would be rejected. The verifier can do better, though, by taking advantage of two details: * Graph data structure APIs can only be used when the ``bpf_spin_lock`` associated with the graph root is held * Both graph data structures have pointer stability * Because graph nodes are allocated with ``bpf_obj_new`` and adding / removing from the root involves fiddling with the ``bpf_{list,rb}_node`` field of the node struct, a graph node will remain at the same address after either operation. Because the associated ``bpf_spin_lock`` must be held by any program adding or removing, if we're in the critical section bounded by that lock, we know that no other program can add or remove until the end of the critical section. This combined with pointer stability means that, until the critical section ends, we can safely access the graph node through ``n`` even after it was used to pass ownership. The verifier considers such a reference a *non-owning reference*. The ref returned by ``bpf_obj_new`` is accordingly considered an *owning reference*. Both terms currently only have meaning in the context of graph nodes and API. **Details** Let's enumerate the properties of both types of references. *owning reference* * This reference controls the lifetime of the pointee * Ownership of pointee must be 'released' by passing it to some graph API kfunc, or via ``bpf_obj_drop``, which ``free``'s the pointee * If not released before program ends, verifier considers program invalid * Access to the pointee's memory will not page fault *non-owning reference* * This reference does not own the pointee * It cannot be used to add the graph node to a graph root, nor ``free``'d via ``bpf_obj_drop`` * No explicit control of lifetime, but can infer valid lifetime based on non-owning ref existence (see explanation below) * Access to the pointee's memory will not page fault From verifier's perspective non-owning references can only exist between spin_lock and spin_unlock. Why? After spin_unlock another program can do arbitrary operations on the data structure like removing and ``free``-ing via bpf_obj_drop. A non-owning ref to some chunk of memory that was remove'd, ``free``'d, and reused via bpf_obj_new would point to an entirely different thing. Or the memory could go away. To prevent this logic violation all non-owning references are invalidated by the verifier after a critical section ends. This is necessary to ensure the "will not page fault" property of non-owning references. So if the verifier hasn't invalidated a non-owning ref, accessing it will not page fault. Currently ``bpf_obj_drop`` is not allowed in the critical section, so if there's a valid non-owning ref, we must be in a critical section, and can conclude that the ref's memory hasn't been dropped-and- ``free``'d or dropped-and-reused. Any reference to a node that is in an rbtree _must_ be non-owning, since the tree has control of the pointee's lifetime. Similarly, any ref to a node that isn't in rbtree _must_ be owning. This results in a nice property: graph API add / remove implementations don't need to check if a node has already been added (or already removed), as the ownership model allows the verifier to prevent such a state from being valid by simply checking types. However, pointer aliasing poses an issue for the above "nice property". Consider the following example: .. code-block:: c struct node_data *n, *m, *o, *p; n = bpf_obj_new(typeof(*n)); /* 1 */ bpf_spin_lock(&lock); bpf_rbtree_add(&tree, n); /* 2 */ m = bpf_rbtree_first(&tree); /* 3 */ o = bpf_rbtree_remove(&tree, n); /* 4 */ p = bpf_rbtree_remove(&tree, m); /* 5 */ bpf_spin_unlock(&lock); bpf_obj_drop(o); bpf_obj_drop(p); /* 6 */ Assume the tree is empty before this program runs. If we track verifier state changes here using numbers in above comments: 1) n is an owning reference 2) n is a non-owning reference, it's been added to the tree 3) n and m are non-owning references, they both point to the same node 4) o is an owning reference, n and m non-owning, all point to same node 5) o and p are owning, n and m non-owning, all point to the same node 6) a double-free has occurred, since o and p point to same node and o was ``free``'d in previous statement States 4 and 5 violate our "nice property", as there are non-owning refs to a node which is not in an rbtree. Statement 5 will try to remove a node which has already been removed as a result of this violation. State 6 is a dangerous double-free. At a minimum we should prevent state 6 from being possible. If we can't also prevent state 5 then we must abandon our "nice property" and check whether a node has already been removed at runtime. We prevent both by generalizing the "invalidate non-owning references" behavior of ``bpf_spin_unlock`` and doing similar invalidation after ``bpf_rbtree_remove``. The logic here being that any graph API kfunc which: * takes an arbitrary node argument * removes it from the data structure * returns an owning reference to the removed node May result in a state where some other non-owning reference points to the same node. So ``remove``-type kfuncs must be considered a non-owning reference invalidation point as well. |