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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 | /* * COPYRIGHT (c) 2008 * The Regents of the University of Michigan * ALL RIGHTS RESERVED * * Permission is granted to use, copy, create derivative works * and redistribute this software and such derivative works * for any purpose, so long as the name of The University of * Michigan is not used in any advertising or publicity * pertaining to the use of distribution of this software * without specific, written prior authorization. If the * above copyright notice or any other identification of the * University of Michigan is included in any copy of any * portion of this software, then the disclaimer below must * also be included. * * THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED AS IS, WITHOUT REPRESENTATION * FROM THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN AS TO ITS FITNESS FOR ANY * PURPOSE, AND WITHOUT WARRANTY BY THE UNIVERSITY OF * MICHIGAN OF ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING * WITHOUT LIMITATION THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. THE * REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN SHALL NOT BE LIABLE * FOR ANY DAMAGES, INCLUDING SPECIAL, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL, OR * CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, WITH RESPECT TO ANY CLAIM ARISING * OUT OF OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OF THE SOFTWARE, EVEN * IF IT HAS BEEN OR IS HEREAFTER ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF * SUCH DAMAGES. */ #include <crypto/skcipher.h> #include <linux/types.h> #include <linux/jiffies.h> #include <linux/sunrpc/gss_krb5.h> #include <linux/pagemap.h> #include "gss_krb5_internal.h" #if IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SUNRPC_DEBUG) # define RPCDBG_FACILITY RPCDBG_AUTH #endif /* * We can shift data by up to LOCAL_BUF_LEN bytes in a pass. If we need * to do more than that, we shift repeatedly. Kevin Coffman reports * seeing 28 bytes as the value used by Microsoft clients and servers * with AES, so this constant is chosen to allow handling 28 in one pass * without using too much stack space. * * If that proves to a problem perhaps we could use a more clever * algorithm. */ #define LOCAL_BUF_LEN 32u static void rotate_buf_a_little(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) { char head[LOCAL_BUF_LEN]; char tmp[LOCAL_BUF_LEN]; unsigned int this_len, i; BUG_ON(shift > LOCAL_BUF_LEN); read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, 0, head, shift); for (i = 0; i + shift < buf->len; i += LOCAL_BUF_LEN) { this_len = min(LOCAL_BUF_LEN, buf->len - (i + shift)); read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, i+shift, tmp, this_len); write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, i, tmp, this_len); } write_bytes_to_xdr_buf(buf, buf->len - shift, head, shift); } static void _rotate_left(struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) { int shifted = 0; int this_shift; shift %= buf->len; while (shifted < shift) { this_shift = min(shift - shifted, LOCAL_BUF_LEN); rotate_buf_a_little(buf, this_shift); shifted += this_shift; } } static void rotate_left(u32 base, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int shift) { struct xdr_buf subbuf; xdr_buf_subsegment(buf, &subbuf, base, buf->len - base); _rotate_left(&subbuf, shift); } u32 gss_krb5_wrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, struct xdr_buf *buf, struct page **pages) { u8 *ptr; time64_t now; u8 flags = 0x00; __be16 *be16ptr; __be64 *be64ptr; u32 err; dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); /* make room for gss token header */ if (xdr_extend_head(buf, offset, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN)) return GSS_S_FAILURE; /* construct gss token header */ ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; *ptr++ = (unsigned char) ((KG2_TOK_WRAP>>8) & 0xff); *ptr++ = (unsigned char) (KG2_TOK_WRAP & 0xff); if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_INITIATOR) == 0) flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR; if ((kctx->flags & KRB5_CTX_FLAG_ACCEPTOR_SUBKEY) != 0) flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_ACCEPTORSUBKEY; /* We always do confidentiality in wrap tokens */ flags |= KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED; *ptr++ = flags; *ptr++ = 0xff; be16ptr = (__be16 *)ptr; *be16ptr++ = 0; /* "inner" token header always uses 0 for RRC */ *be16ptr++ = 0; be64ptr = (__be64 *)be16ptr; *be64ptr = cpu_to_be64(atomic64_fetch_inc(&kctx->seq_send64)); err = (*kctx->gk5e->encrypt)(kctx, offset, buf, pages); if (err) return err; now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); return (kctx->endtime < now) ? GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED : GSS_S_COMPLETE; } u32 gss_krb5_unwrap_v2(struct krb5_ctx *kctx, int offset, int len, struct xdr_buf *buf, unsigned int *slack, unsigned int *align) { time64_t now; u8 *ptr; u8 flags = 0x00; u16 ec, rrc; int err; u32 headskip, tailskip; u8 decrypted_hdr[GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN]; unsigned int movelen; dprintk("RPC: %s\n", __func__); ptr = buf->head[0].iov_base + offset; if (be16_to_cpu(*((__be16 *)ptr)) != KG2_TOK_WRAP) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; flags = ptr[2]; if ((!kctx->initiate && (flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR)) || (kctx->initiate && !(flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SENTBYACCEPTOR))) return GSS_S_BAD_SIG; if ((flags & KG2_TOKEN_FLAG_SEALED) == 0) { dprintk("%s: token missing expected sealed flag\n", __func__); return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; } if (ptr[3] != 0xff) return GSS_S_DEFECTIVE_TOKEN; ec = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 4)); rrc = be16_to_cpup((__be16 *)(ptr + 6)); /* * NOTE: the sequence number at ptr + 8 is skipped, rpcsec_gss * doesn't want it checked; see page 6 of rfc 2203. */ if (rrc != 0) rotate_left(offset + 16, buf, rrc); err = (*kctx->gk5e->decrypt)(kctx, offset, len, buf, &headskip, &tailskip); if (err) return GSS_S_FAILURE; /* * Retrieve the decrypted gss token header and verify * it against the original */ err = read_bytes_from_xdr_buf(buf, len - GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN - tailskip, decrypted_hdr, GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN); if (err) { dprintk("%s: error %u getting decrypted_hdr\n", __func__, err); return GSS_S_FAILURE; } if (memcmp(ptr, decrypted_hdr, 6) || memcmp(ptr + 8, decrypted_hdr + 8, 8)) { dprintk("%s: token hdr, plaintext hdr mismatch!\n", __func__); return GSS_S_FAILURE; } /* do sequencing checks */ /* it got through unscathed. Make sure the context is unexpired */ now = ktime_get_real_seconds(); if (now > kctx->endtime) return GSS_S_CONTEXT_EXPIRED; /* * Move the head data back to the right position in xdr_buf. * We ignore any "ec" data since it might be in the head or * the tail, and we really don't need to deal with it. * Note that buf->head[0].iov_len may indicate the available * head buffer space rather than that actually occupied. */ movelen = min_t(unsigned int, buf->head[0].iov_len, len); movelen -= offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; BUG_ON(offset + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip + movelen > buf->head[0].iov_len); memmove(ptr, ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip, movelen); buf->head[0].iov_len -= GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip; buf->len = len - (GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); /* Trim off the trailing "extra count" and checksum blob */ xdr_buf_trim(buf, ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); *align = XDR_QUADLEN(GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + headskip); *slack = *align + XDR_QUADLEN(ec + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN + tailskip); return GSS_S_COMPLETE; } |