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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260 261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272 273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281 282 283 284 285 286 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296 297 298 299 300 301 302 303 304 305 306 307 308 309 310 311 312 313 314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323 324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336 337 338 339 340 341 342 343 344 345 346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359 360 361 362 363 364 365 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375 376 377 378 379 380 381 382 383 384 385 386 387 388 389 390 391 392 393 394 395 396 397 398 399 400 401 402 403 404 405 406 407 408 409 410 411 412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422 423 424 425 426 427 428 429 430 431 432 433 434 435 436 437 438 439 440 441 442 443 444 445 446 447 448 449 450 451 452 453 454 455 456 457 458 459 460 461 462 463 464 465 466 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476 477 478 479 480 481 482 483 484 485 486 487 488 489 490 491 492 493 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525 526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533 534 535 536 537 538 539 540 541 542 543 544 545 546 547 548 549 550 551 552 553 554 555 556 557 558 559 560 561 562 563 564 565 566 567 568 569 570 571 572 573 574 575 576 577 578 579 580 581 582 583 584 585 586 587 588 589 590 591 592 593 594 595 596 597 598 599 600 601 602 603 604 605 606 607 608 609 610 611 612 613 614 615 616 617 618 619 620 621 622 623 624 625 626 627 628 629 630 631 632 633 634 635 636 637 638 639 640 641 642 643 644 645 646 647 648 649 650 651 652 653 654 655 656 657 658 659 660 661 662 663 664 665 666 667 668 669 670 671 672 673 674 675 676 677 678 679 680 681 682 683 684 685 686 687 688 689 690 691 692 693 694 695 696 697 698 699 700 701 702 703 704 705 706 707 708 709 710 711 712 713 714 715 716 717 718 719 720 721 722 723 724 725 726 727 728 729 730 731 732 733 734 735 736 737 738 739 740 741 742 743 744 745 746 747 748 749 750 751 752 753 754 755 756 757 758 759 760 761 762 763 764 765 766 767 768 769 770 771 772 773 774 775 776 777 778 779 780 781 782 783 784 785 786 787 788 789 790 791 792 793 794 795 796 797 798 799 800 801 802 803 804 805 806 807 808 809 810 811 812 813 814 815 816 817 818 819 820 821 822 823 824 825 826 827 828 829 830 831 832 833 834 835 836 837 838 839 840 841 842 843 844 845 846 847 848 849 850 851 852 853 854 855 856 857 858 859 860 861 862 863 864 865 866 867 868 869 870 871 872 873 874 875 876 877 878 879 880 881 882 883 884 885 886 887 888 889 890 891 892 893 894 895 896 897 898 899 900 901 902 903 904 905 906 907 908 909 910 911 912 913 914 915 916 917 918 919 920 921 922 923 924 925 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-or-later /* Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement Method [RFC2631] * * Copyright (c) 2016, Intel Corporation * Authors: Salvatore Benedetto <salvatore.benedetto@intel.com> */ #include <linux/fips.h> #include <linux/module.h> #include <crypto/internal/kpp.h> #include <crypto/kpp.h> #include <crypto/dh.h> #include <crypto/rng.h> #include <linux/mpi.h> struct dh_ctx { MPI p; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ MPI g; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ MPI xa; /* Value is guaranteed to be set. */ }; static void dh_clear_ctx(struct dh_ctx *ctx) { mpi_free(ctx->p); mpi_free(ctx->g); mpi_free(ctx->xa); memset(ctx, 0, sizeof(*ctx)); } /* * If base is g we compute the public key * ya = g^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] * else if base if the counterpart public key we compute the shared secret * ZZ = yb^xa mod p; [RFC2631 sec 2.1.1] */ static int _compute_val(const struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI base, MPI val) { /* val = base^xa mod p */ return mpi_powm(val, base, ctx->xa, ctx->p); } static inline struct dh_ctx *dh_get_ctx(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { return kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); } static int dh_check_params_length(unsigned int p_len) { if (fips_enabled) return (p_len < 2048) ? -EINVAL : 0; return (p_len < 1536) ? -EINVAL : 0; } static int dh_set_params(struct dh_ctx *ctx, struct dh *params) { if (dh_check_params_length(params->p_size << 3)) return -EINVAL; ctx->p = mpi_read_raw_data(params->p, params->p_size); if (!ctx->p) return -EINVAL; ctx->g = mpi_read_raw_data(params->g, params->g_size); if (!ctx->g) return -EINVAL; return 0; } static int dh_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buf, unsigned int len) { struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); struct dh params; /* Free the old MPI key if any */ dh_clear_ctx(ctx); if (crypto_dh_decode_key(buf, len, ¶ms) < 0) goto err_clear_ctx; if (dh_set_params(ctx, ¶ms) < 0) goto err_clear_ctx; ctx->xa = mpi_read_raw_data(params.key, params.key_size); if (!ctx->xa) goto err_clear_ctx; return 0; err_clear_ctx: dh_clear_ctx(ctx); return -EINVAL; } /* * SP800-56A public key verification: * * * For the safe-prime groups in FIPS mode, Q can be computed * trivially from P and a full validation according to SP800-56A * section 5.6.2.3.1 is performed. * * * For all other sets of group parameters, only a partial validation * according to SP800-56A section 5.6.2.3.2 is performed. */ static int dh_is_pubkey_valid(struct dh_ctx *ctx, MPI y) { if (unlikely(!ctx->p)) return -EINVAL; /* * Step 1: Verify that 2 <= y <= p - 2. * * The upper limit check is actually y < p instead of y < p - 1 * in order to save one mpi_sub_ui() invocation here. Note that * p - 1 is the non-trivial element of the subgroup of order 2 and * thus, the check on y^q below would fail if y == p - 1. */ if (mpi_cmp_ui(y, 1) < 1 || mpi_cmp(y, ctx->p) >= 0) return -EINVAL; /* * Step 2: Verify that 1 = y^q mod p * * For the safe-prime groups q = (p - 1)/2. */ if (fips_enabled) { MPI val, q; int ret; val = mpi_alloc(0); if (!val) return -ENOMEM; q = mpi_alloc(mpi_get_nlimbs(ctx->p)); if (!q) { mpi_free(val); return -ENOMEM; } /* * ->p is odd, so no need to explicitly subtract one * from it before shifting to the right. */ mpi_rshift(q, ctx->p, 1); ret = mpi_powm(val, y, q, ctx->p); mpi_free(q); if (ret) { mpi_free(val); return ret; } ret = mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1); mpi_free(val); if (ret != 0) return -EINVAL; } return 0; } static int dh_compute_value(struct kpp_request *req) { struct crypto_kpp *tfm = crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req); struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); MPI base, val = mpi_alloc(0); int ret = 0; int sign; if (!val) return -ENOMEM; if (unlikely(!ctx->xa)) { ret = -EINVAL; goto err_free_val; } if (req->src) { base = mpi_read_raw_from_sgl(req->src, req->src_len); if (!base) { ret = -EINVAL; goto err_free_val; } ret = dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, base); if (ret) goto err_free_base; } else { base = ctx->g; } ret = _compute_val(ctx, base, val); if (ret) goto err_free_base; if (fips_enabled) { /* SP800-56A rev3 5.7.1.1 check: Validation of shared secret */ if (req->src) { MPI pone; /* z <= 1 */ if (mpi_cmp_ui(val, 1) < 1) { ret = -EBADMSG; goto err_free_base; } /* z == p - 1 */ pone = mpi_alloc(0); if (!pone) { ret = -ENOMEM; goto err_free_base; } ret = mpi_sub_ui(pone, ctx->p, 1); if (!ret && !mpi_cmp(pone, val)) ret = -EBADMSG; mpi_free(pone); if (ret) goto err_free_base; /* SP800-56A rev 3 5.6.2.1.3 key check */ } else { if (dh_is_pubkey_valid(ctx, val)) { ret = -EAGAIN; goto err_free_val; } } } ret = mpi_write_to_sgl(val, req->dst, req->dst_len, &sign); if (ret) goto err_free_base; if (sign < 0) ret = -EBADMSG; err_free_base: if (req->src) mpi_free(base); err_free_val: mpi_free(val); return ret; } static unsigned int dh_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); return mpi_get_size(ctx->p); } static void dh_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_ctx *ctx = dh_get_ctx(tfm); dh_clear_ctx(ctx); } static struct kpp_alg dh = { .set_secret = dh_set_secret, .generate_public_key = dh_compute_value, .compute_shared_secret = dh_compute_value, .max_size = dh_max_size, .exit = dh_exit_tfm, .base = { .cra_name = "dh", .cra_driver_name = "dh-generic", .cra_priority = 100, .cra_module = THIS_MODULE, .cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_ctx), }, }; struct dh_safe_prime { unsigned int max_strength; unsigned int p_size; const char *p; }; static const char safe_prime_g[] = { 2 }; struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx { struct crypto_kpp_spawn dh_spawn; const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime; }; struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx { struct crypto_kpp *dh_tfm; }; static void dh_safe_prime_free_instance(struct kpp_instance *inst) { struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); crypto_drop_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn); kfree(inst); } static inline struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx( struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { return kpp_instance_ctx(kpp_alg_instance(tfm)); } static int dh_safe_prime_init_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); tfm_ctx->dh_tfm = crypto_spawn_kpp(&inst_ctx->dh_spawn); if (IS_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm)) return PTR_ERR(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); return 0; } static void dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); crypto_free_kpp(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); } static u64 __add_u64_to_be(__be64 *dst, unsigned int n, u64 val) { unsigned int i; for (i = n; val && i > 0; --i) { u64 tmp = be64_to_cpu(dst[i - 1]); tmp += val; val = tmp >= val ? 0 : 1; dst[i - 1] = cpu_to_be64(tmp); } return val; } static void *dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime, unsigned int *key_size) { unsigned int n, oversampling_size; __be64 *key; int err; u64 h, o; /* * Generate a private key following NIST SP800-56Ar3, * sec. 5.6.1.1.1 and 5.6.1.1.3 resp.. * * 5.6.1.1.1: choose key length N such that * 2 * ->max_strength <= N <= log2(q) + 1 = ->p_size * 8 - 1 * with q = (p - 1) / 2 for the safe-prime groups. * Choose the lower bound's next power of two for N in order to * avoid excessively large private keys while still * maintaining some extra reserve beyond the bare minimum in * most cases. Note that for each entry in safe_prime_groups[], * the following holds for such N: * - N >= 256, in particular it is a multiple of 2^6 = 64 * bits and * - N < log2(q) + 1, i.e. N respects the upper bound. */ n = roundup_pow_of_two(2 * safe_prime->max_strength); WARN_ON_ONCE(n & ((1u << 6) - 1)); n >>= 6; /* Convert N into units of u64. */ /* * Reserve one extra u64 to hold the extra random bits * required as per 5.6.1.1.3. */ oversampling_size = (n + 1) * sizeof(__be64); key = kmalloc(oversampling_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!key) return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); /* * 5.6.1.1.3, step 3 (and implicitly step 4): obtain N + 64 * random bits and interpret them as a big endian integer. */ err = -EFAULT; if (crypto_get_default_rng()) goto out_err; err = crypto_rng_get_bytes(crypto_default_rng, (u8 *)key, oversampling_size); crypto_put_default_rng(); if (err) goto out_err; /* * 5.6.1.1.3, step 5 is implicit: 2^N < q and thus, * M = min(2^N, q) = 2^N. * * For step 6, calculate * key = (key[] mod (M - 1)) + 1 = (key[] mod (2^N - 1)) + 1. * * In order to avoid expensive divisions, note that * 2^N mod (2^N - 1) = 1 and thus, for any integer h, * 2^N * h mod (2^N - 1) = h mod (2^N - 1) always holds. * The big endian integer key[] composed of n + 1 64bit words * may be written as key[] = h * 2^N + l, with h = key[0] * representing the 64 most significant bits and l * corresponding to the remaining 2^N bits. With the remark * from above, * h * 2^N + l mod (2^N - 1) = l + h mod (2^N - 1). * As both, l and h are less than 2^N, their sum after * this first reduction is guaranteed to be <= 2^(N + 1) - 2. * Or equivalently, that their sum can again be written as * h' * 2^N + l' with h' now either zero or one and if one, * then l' <= 2^N - 2. Thus, all bits at positions >= N will * be zero after a second reduction: * h' * 2^N + l' mod (2^N - 1) = l' + h' mod (2^N - 1). * At this point, it is still possible that * l' + h' = 2^N - 1, i.e. that l' + h' mod (2^N - 1) * is zero. This condition will be detected below by means of * the final increment overflowing in this case. */ h = be64_to_cpu(key[0]); h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h); h = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, h); WARN_ON_ONCE(h); /* Increment to obtain the final result. */ o = __add_u64_to_be(key + 1, n, 1); /* * The overflow bit o from the increment is either zero or * one. If zero, key[1:n] holds the final result in big-endian * order. If one, key[1:n] is zero now, but needs to be set to * one, c.f. above. */ if (o) key[n] = cpu_to_be64(1); /* n is in units of u64, convert to bytes. */ *key_size = n << 3; /* Strip the leading extra __be64, which is (virtually) zero by now. */ memmove(key, &key[1], *key_size); return key; out_err: kfree_sensitive(key); return ERR_PTR(err); } static int dh_safe_prime_set_secret(struct crypto_kpp *tfm, const void *buffer, unsigned int len) { struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *inst_ctx = dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx(tfm); struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); struct dh params = {}; void *buf = NULL, *key = NULL; unsigned int buf_size; int err; if (buffer) { err = __crypto_dh_decode_key(buffer, len, ¶ms); if (err) return err; if (params.p_size || params.g_size) return -EINVAL; } params.p = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p; params.p_size = inst_ctx->safe_prime->p_size; params.g = safe_prime_g; params.g_size = sizeof(safe_prime_g); if (!params.key_size) { key = dh_safe_prime_gen_privkey(inst_ctx->safe_prime, ¶ms.key_size); if (IS_ERR(key)) return PTR_ERR(key); params.key = key; } buf_size = crypto_dh_key_len(¶ms); buf = kmalloc(buf_size, GFP_KERNEL); if (!buf) { err = -ENOMEM; goto out; } err = crypto_dh_encode_key(buf, buf_size, ¶ms); if (err) goto out; err = crypto_kpp_set_secret(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm, buf, buf_size); out: kfree_sensitive(buf); kfree_sensitive(key); return err; } static void dh_safe_prime_complete_req(struct crypto_async_request *dh_req, int err) { struct kpp_request *req = dh_req->data; kpp_request_complete(req, err); } static struct kpp_request *dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(struct kpp_request *req) { struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(crypto_kpp_reqtfm(req)); struct kpp_request *dh_req = kpp_request_ctx(req); kpp_request_set_tfm(dh_req, tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); kpp_request_set_callback(dh_req, req->base.flags, dh_safe_prime_complete_req, req); kpp_request_set_input(dh_req, req->src, req->src_len); kpp_request_set_output(dh_req, req->dst, req->dst_len); return dh_req; } static int dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key(struct kpp_request *req) { struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); return crypto_kpp_generate_public_key(dh_req); } static int dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret(struct kpp_request *req) { struct kpp_request *dh_req = dh_safe_prime_prepare_dh_req(req); return crypto_kpp_compute_shared_secret(dh_req); } static unsigned int dh_safe_prime_max_size(struct crypto_kpp *tfm) { struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx *tfm_ctx = kpp_tfm_ctx(tfm); return crypto_kpp_maxsize(tfm_ctx->dh_tfm); } static int __maybe_unused __dh_safe_prime_create( struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb, const struct dh_safe_prime *safe_prime) { struct kpp_instance *inst; struct dh_safe_prime_instance_ctx *ctx; const char *dh_name; struct kpp_alg *dh_alg; u32 mask; int err; err = crypto_check_attr_type(tb, CRYPTO_ALG_TYPE_KPP, &mask); if (err) return err; dh_name = crypto_attr_alg_name(tb[1]); if (IS_ERR(dh_name)) return PTR_ERR(dh_name); inst = kzalloc(sizeof(*inst) + sizeof(*ctx), GFP_KERNEL); if (!inst) return -ENOMEM; ctx = kpp_instance_ctx(inst); err = crypto_grab_kpp(&ctx->dh_spawn, kpp_crypto_instance(inst), dh_name, 0, mask); if (err) goto err_free_inst; err = -EINVAL; dh_alg = crypto_spawn_kpp_alg(&ctx->dh_spawn); if (strcmp(dh_alg->base.cra_name, "dh")) goto err_free_inst; ctx->safe_prime = safe_prime; err = crypto_inst_setname(kpp_crypto_instance(inst), tmpl->name, &dh_alg->base); if (err) goto err_free_inst; inst->alg.set_secret = dh_safe_prime_set_secret; inst->alg.generate_public_key = dh_safe_prime_generate_public_key; inst->alg.compute_shared_secret = dh_safe_prime_compute_shared_secret; inst->alg.max_size = dh_safe_prime_max_size; inst->alg.init = dh_safe_prime_init_tfm; inst->alg.exit = dh_safe_prime_exit_tfm; inst->alg.reqsize = sizeof(struct kpp_request) + dh_alg->reqsize; inst->alg.base.cra_priority = dh_alg->base.cra_priority; inst->alg.base.cra_module = THIS_MODULE; inst->alg.base.cra_ctxsize = sizeof(struct dh_safe_prime_tfm_ctx); inst->free = dh_safe_prime_free_instance; err = kpp_register_instance(tmpl, inst); if (err) goto err_free_inst; return 0; err_free_inst: dh_safe_prime_free_instance(inst); return err; } #ifdef CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe2048_prime = { .max_strength = 112, .p_size = 256, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x28\x5c\x97\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe3072_prime = { .max_strength = 128, .p_size = 384, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\xc6\x2e\x37\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe4096_prime = { .max_strength = 152, .p_size = 512, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x65\x5f\x6a\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe6144_prime = { .max_strength = 176, .p_size = 768, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xd0\xe4\x0e\x65\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static const struct dh_safe_prime ffdhe8192_prime = { .max_strength = 200, .p_size = 1024, .p = "\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xad\xf8\x54\x58\xa2\xbb\x4a\x9a" "\xaf\xdc\x56\x20\x27\x3d\x3c\xf1\xd8\xb9\xc5\x83\xce\x2d\x36\x95" "\xa9\xe1\x36\x41\x14\x64\x33\xfb\xcc\x93\x9d\xce\x24\x9b\x3e\xf9" "\x7d\x2f\xe3\x63\x63\x0c\x75\xd8\xf6\x81\xb2\x02\xae\xc4\x61\x7a" "\xd3\xdf\x1e\xd5\xd5\xfd\x65\x61\x24\x33\xf5\x1f\x5f\x06\x6e\xd0" "\x85\x63\x65\x55\x3d\xed\x1a\xf3\xb5\x57\x13\x5e\x7f\x57\xc9\x35" "\x98\x4f\x0c\x70\xe0\xe6\x8b\x77\xe2\xa6\x89\xda\xf3\xef\xe8\x72" "\x1d\xf1\x58\xa1\x36\xad\xe7\x35\x30\xac\xca\x4f\x48\x3a\x79\x7a" "\xbc\x0a\xb1\x82\xb3\x24\xfb\x61\xd1\x08\xa9\x4b\xb2\xc8\xe3\xfb" "\xb9\x6a\xda\xb7\x60\xd7\xf4\x68\x1d\x4f\x42\xa3\xde\x39\x4d\xf4" "\xae\x56\xed\xe7\x63\x72\xbb\x19\x0b\x07\xa7\xc8\xee\x0a\x6d\x70" "\x9e\x02\xfc\xe1\xcd\xf7\xe2\xec\xc0\x34\x04\xcd\x28\x34\x2f\x61" "\x91\x72\xfe\x9c\xe9\x85\x83\xff\x8e\x4f\x12\x32\xee\xf2\x81\x83" "\xc3\xfe\x3b\x1b\x4c\x6f\xad\x73\x3b\xb5\xfc\xbc\x2e\xc2\x20\x05" "\xc5\x8e\xf1\x83\x7d\x16\x83\xb2\xc6\xf3\x4a\x26\xc1\xb2\xef\xfa" "\x88\x6b\x42\x38\x61\x1f\xcf\xdc\xde\x35\x5b\x3b\x65\x19\x03\x5b" "\xbc\x34\xf4\xde\xf9\x9c\x02\x38\x61\xb4\x6f\xc9\xd6\xe6\xc9\x07" "\x7a\xd9\x1d\x26\x91\xf7\xf7\xee\x59\x8c\xb0\xfa\xc1\x86\xd9\x1c" "\xae\xfe\x13\x09\x85\x13\x92\x70\xb4\x13\x0c\x93\xbc\x43\x79\x44" "\xf4\xfd\x44\x52\xe2\xd7\x4d\xd3\x64\xf2\xe2\x1e\x71\xf5\x4b\xff" "\x5c\xae\x82\xab\x9c\x9d\xf6\x9e\xe8\x6d\x2b\xc5\x22\x36\x3a\x0d" "\xab\xc5\x21\x97\x9b\x0d\xea\xda\x1d\xbf\x9a\x42\xd5\xc4\x48\x4e" "\x0a\xbc\xd0\x6b\xfa\x53\xdd\xef\x3c\x1b\x20\xee\x3f\xd5\x9d\x7c" "\x25\xe4\x1d\x2b\x66\x9e\x1e\xf1\x6e\x6f\x52\xc3\x16\x4d\xf4\xfb" "\x79\x30\xe9\xe4\xe5\x88\x57\xb6\xac\x7d\x5f\x42\xd6\x9f\x6d\x18" "\x77\x63\xcf\x1d\x55\x03\x40\x04\x87\xf5\x5b\xa5\x7e\x31\xcc\x7a" "\x71\x35\xc8\x86\xef\xb4\x31\x8a\xed\x6a\x1e\x01\x2d\x9e\x68\x32" "\xa9\x07\x60\x0a\x91\x81\x30\xc4\x6d\xc7\x78\xf9\x71\xad\x00\x38" "\x09\x29\x99\xa3\x33\xcb\x8b\x7a\x1a\x1d\xb9\x3d\x71\x40\x00\x3c" "\x2a\x4e\xce\xa9\xf9\x8d\x0a\xcc\x0a\x82\x91\xcd\xce\xc9\x7d\xcf" "\x8e\xc9\xb5\x5a\x7f\x88\xa4\x6b\x4d\xb5\xa8\x51\xf4\x41\x82\xe1" "\xc6\x8a\x00\x7e\x5e\x0d\xd9\x02\x0b\xfd\x64\xb6\x45\x03\x6c\x7a" "\x4e\x67\x7d\x2c\x38\x53\x2a\x3a\x23\xba\x44\x42\xca\xf5\x3e\xa6" "\x3b\xb4\x54\x32\x9b\x76\x24\xc8\x91\x7b\xdd\x64\xb1\xc0\xfd\x4c" "\xb3\x8e\x8c\x33\x4c\x70\x1c\x3a\xcd\xad\x06\x57\xfc\xcf\xec\x71" "\x9b\x1f\x5c\x3e\x4e\x46\x04\x1f\x38\x81\x47\xfb\x4c\xfd\xb4\x77" "\xa5\x24\x71\xf7\xa9\xa9\x69\x10\xb8\x55\x32\x2e\xdb\x63\x40\xd8" "\xa0\x0e\xf0\x92\x35\x05\x11\xe3\x0a\xbe\xc1\xff\xf9\xe3\xa2\x6e" "\x7f\xb2\x9f\x8c\x18\x30\x23\xc3\x58\x7e\x38\xda\x00\x77\xd9\xb4" "\x76\x3e\x4e\x4b\x94\xb2\xbb\xc1\x94\xc6\x65\x1e\x77\xca\xf9\x92" "\xee\xaa\xc0\x23\x2a\x28\x1b\xf6\xb3\xa7\x39\xc1\x22\x61\x16\x82" "\x0a\xe8\xdb\x58\x47\xa6\x7c\xbe\xf9\xc9\x09\x1b\x46\x2d\x53\x8c" "\xd7\x2b\x03\x74\x6a\xe7\x7f\x5e\x62\x29\x2c\x31\x15\x62\xa8\x46" "\x50\x5d\xc8\x2d\xb8\x54\x33\x8a\xe4\x9f\x52\x35\xc9\x5b\x91\x17" "\x8c\xcf\x2d\xd5\xca\xce\xf4\x03\xec\x9d\x18\x10\xc6\x27\x2b\x04" "\x5b\x3b\x71\xf9\xdc\x6b\x80\xd6\x3f\xdd\x4a\x8e\x9a\xdb\x1e\x69" "\x62\xa6\x95\x26\xd4\x31\x61\xc1\xa4\x1d\x57\x0d\x79\x38\xda\xd4" "\xa4\x0e\x32\x9c\xcf\xf4\x6a\xaa\x36\xad\x00\x4c\xf6\x00\xc8\x38" "\x1e\x42\x5a\x31\xd9\x51\xae\x64\xfd\xb2\x3f\xce\xc9\x50\x9d\x43" "\x68\x7f\xeb\x69\xed\xd1\xcc\x5e\x0b\x8c\xc3\xbd\xf6\x4b\x10\xef" "\x86\xb6\x31\x42\xa3\xab\x88\x29\x55\x5b\x2f\x74\x7c\x93\x26\x65" "\xcb\x2c\x0f\x1c\xc0\x1b\xd7\x02\x29\x38\x88\x39\xd2\xaf\x05\xe4" "\x54\x50\x4a\xc7\x8b\x75\x82\x82\x28\x46\xc0\xba\x35\xc3\x5f\x5c" "\x59\x16\x0c\xc0\x46\xfd\x82\x51\x54\x1f\xc6\x8c\x9c\x86\xb0\x22" "\xbb\x70\x99\x87\x6a\x46\x0e\x74\x51\xa8\xa9\x31\x09\x70\x3f\xee" "\x1c\x21\x7e\x6c\x38\x26\xe5\x2c\x51\xaa\x69\x1e\x0e\x42\x3c\xfc" "\x99\xe9\xe3\x16\x50\xc1\x21\x7b\x62\x48\x16\xcd\xad\x9a\x95\xf9" "\xd5\xb8\x01\x94\x88\xd9\xc0\xa0\xa1\xfe\x30\x75\xa5\x77\xe2\x31" "\x83\xf8\x1d\x4a\x3f\x2f\xa4\x57\x1e\xfc\x8c\xe0\xba\x8a\x4f\xe8" "\xb6\x85\x5d\xfe\x72\xb0\xa6\x6e\xde\xd2\xfb\xab\xfb\xe5\x8a\x30" "\xfa\xfa\xbe\x1c\x5d\x71\xa8\x7e\x2f\x74\x1e\xf8\xc1\xfe\x86\xfe" "\xa6\xbb\xfd\xe5\x30\x67\x7f\x0d\x97\xd1\x1d\x49\xf7\xa8\x44\x3d" "\x08\x22\xe5\x06\xa9\xf4\x61\x4e\x01\x1e\x2a\x94\x83\x8f\xf8\x8c" "\xd6\x8c\x8b\xb7\xc5\xc6\x42\x4c\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff\xff", }; static int dh_ffdhe2048_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe2048_prime); } static int dh_ffdhe3072_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe3072_prime); } static int dh_ffdhe4096_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe4096_prime); } static int dh_ffdhe6144_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe6144_prime); } static int dh_ffdhe8192_create(struct crypto_template *tmpl, struct rtattr **tb) { return __dh_safe_prime_create(tmpl, tb, &ffdhe8192_prime); } static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = { { .name = "ffdhe2048", .create = dh_ffdhe2048_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, { .name = "ffdhe3072", .create = dh_ffdhe3072_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, { .name = "ffdhe4096", .create = dh_ffdhe4096_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, { .name = "ffdhe6144", .create = dh_ffdhe6144_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, { .name = "ffdhe8192", .create = dh_ffdhe8192_create, .module = THIS_MODULE, }, }; #else /* ! CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ static struct crypto_template crypto_ffdhe_templates[] = {}; #endif /* CONFIG_CRYPTO_DH_RFC7919_GROUPS */ static int __init dh_init(void) { int err; err = crypto_register_kpp(&dh); if (err) return err; err = crypto_register_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates, ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); if (err) { crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh); return err; } return 0; } static void __exit dh_exit(void) { crypto_unregister_templates(crypto_ffdhe_templates, ARRAY_SIZE(crypto_ffdhe_templates)); crypto_unregister_kpp(&dh); } subsys_initcall(dh_init); module_exit(dh_exit); MODULE_ALIAS_CRYPTO("dh"); MODULE_LICENSE("GPL"); MODULE_DESCRIPTION("DH generic algorithm"); |