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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* -*- linux-c -*- * sysctl_net.c: sysctl interface to net subsystem. * * Begun April 1, 1996, Mike Shaver. * Added /proc/sys/net directories for each protocol family. [MS] * * Revision 1.2 1996/05/08 20:24:40 shaver * Added bits for NET_BRIDGE and the NET_IPV4_ARP stuff and * NET_IPV4_IP_FORWARD. * * */ #include <linux/mm.h> #include <linux/export.h> #include <linux/sysctl.h> #include <linux/nsproxy.h> #include <net/sock.h> #ifdef CONFIG_INET #include <net/ip.h> #endif #ifdef CONFIG_NET #include <linux/if_ether.h> #endif static struct ctl_table_set * net_ctl_header_lookup(struct ctl_table_root *root) { return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls; } static int is_seen(struct ctl_table_set *set) { return ¤t->nsproxy->net_ns->sysctls == set; } /* Return standard mode bits for table entry. */ static int net_ctl_permissions(struct ctl_table_header *head, struct ctl_table *table) { struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls); /* Allow network administrator to have same access as root. */ if (ns_capable_noaudit(net->user_ns, CAP_NET_ADMIN)) { int mode = (table->mode >> 6) & 7; return (mode << 6) | (mode << 3) | mode; } return table->mode; } static void net_ctl_set_ownership(struct ctl_table_header *head, struct ctl_table *table, kuid_t *uid, kgid_t *gid) { struct net *net = container_of(head->set, struct net, sysctls); kuid_t ns_root_uid; kgid_t ns_root_gid; ns_root_uid = make_kuid(net->user_ns, 0); if (uid_valid(ns_root_uid)) *uid = ns_root_uid; ns_root_gid = make_kgid(net->user_ns, 0); if (gid_valid(ns_root_gid)) *gid = ns_root_gid; } static struct ctl_table_root net_sysctl_root = { .lookup = net_ctl_header_lookup, .permissions = net_ctl_permissions, .set_ownership = net_ctl_set_ownership, }; static int __net_init sysctl_net_init(struct net *net) { setup_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls, &net_sysctl_root, is_seen); return 0; } static void __net_exit sysctl_net_exit(struct net *net) { retire_sysctl_set(&net->sysctls); } static struct pernet_operations sysctl_pernet_ops = { .init = sysctl_net_init, .exit = sysctl_net_exit, }; static struct ctl_table_header *net_header; __init int net_sysctl_init(void) { static struct ctl_table empty[1]; int ret = -ENOMEM; /* Avoid limitations in the sysctl implementation by * registering "/proc/sys/net" as an empty directory not in a * network namespace. */ net_header = register_sysctl("net", empty); if (!net_header) goto out; ret = register_pernet_subsys(&sysctl_pernet_ops); if (ret) goto out1; out: return ret; out1: unregister_sysctl_table(net_header); net_header = NULL; goto out; } /* Verify that sysctls for non-init netns are safe by either: * 1) being read-only, or * 2) having a data pointer which points outside of the global kernel/module * data segment, and rather into the heap where a per-net object was * allocated. */ static void ensure_safe_net_sysctl(struct net *net, const char *path, struct ctl_table *table) { struct ctl_table *ent; pr_debug("Registering net sysctl (net %p): %s\n", net, path); for (ent = table; ent->procname; ent++) { unsigned long addr; const char *where; pr_debug(" procname=%s mode=%o proc_handler=%ps data=%p\n", ent->procname, ent->mode, ent->proc_handler, ent->data); /* If it's not writable inside the netns, then it can't hurt. */ if ((ent->mode & 0222) == 0) { pr_debug(" Not writable by anyone\n"); continue; } /* Where does data point? */ addr = (unsigned long)ent->data; if (is_module_address(addr)) where = "module"; else if (core_kernel_data(addr)) where = "kernel"; else continue; /* If it is writable and points to kernel/module global * data, then it's probably a netns leak. */ WARN(1, "sysctl %s/%s: data points to %s global data: %ps\n", path, ent->procname, where, ent->data); /* Make it "safe" by dropping writable perms */ ent->mode &= ~0222; } } struct ctl_table_header *register_net_sysctl(struct net *net, const char *path, struct ctl_table *table) { if (!net_eq(net, &init_net)) ensure_safe_net_sysctl(net, path, table); return __register_sysctl_table(&net->sysctls, path, table); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(register_net_sysctl); void unregister_net_sysctl_table(struct ctl_table_header *header) { unregister_sysctl_table(header); } EXPORT_SYMBOL_GPL(unregister_net_sysctl_table); |