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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 117 118 119 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 184 185 186 187 188 189 190 191 192 193 194 195 196 197 198 199 200 201 202 203 204 205 206 207 208 209 210 211 212 213 214 215 216 217 218 219 220 221 222 223 224 225 226 227 228 229 230 231 232 233 234 235 236 237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251 252 253 254 255 | // SPDX-License-Identifier: GPL-2.0-only /* * Module and Firmware Pinning Security Module * * Copyright 2011-2016 Google Inc. * * Author: Kees Cook <keescook@chromium.org> */ #define pr_fmt(fmt) "LoadPin: " fmt #include <linux/module.h> #include <linux/fs.h> #include <linux/kernel_read_file.h> #include <linux/lsm_hooks.h> #include <linux/mount.h> #include <linux/blkdev.h> #include <linux/path.h> #include <linux/sched.h> /* current */ #include <linux/string_helpers.h> static void report_load(const char *origin, struct file *file, char *operation) { char *cmdline, *pathname; pathname = kstrdup_quotable_file(file, GFP_KERNEL); cmdline = kstrdup_quotable_cmdline(current, GFP_KERNEL); pr_notice("%s %s obj=%s%s%s pid=%d cmdline=%s%s%s\n", origin, operation, (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "", pathname, (pathname && pathname[0] != '<') ? "\"" : "", task_pid_nr(current), cmdline ? "\"" : "", cmdline, cmdline ? "\"" : ""); kfree(cmdline); kfree(pathname); } static int enforce = IS_ENABLED(CONFIG_SECURITY_LOADPIN_ENFORCE); static char *exclude_read_files[READING_MAX_ID]; static int ignore_read_file_id[READING_MAX_ID] __ro_after_init; static struct super_block *pinned_root; static DEFINE_SPINLOCK(pinned_root_spinlock); #ifdef CONFIG_SYSCTL static struct ctl_path loadpin_sysctl_path[] = { { .procname = "kernel", }, { .procname = "loadpin", }, { } }; static struct ctl_table loadpin_sysctl_table[] = { { .procname = "enforce", .data = &enforce, .maxlen = sizeof(int), .mode = 0644, .proc_handler = proc_dointvec_minmax, .extra1 = SYSCTL_ZERO, .extra2 = SYSCTL_ONE, }, { } }; /* * This must be called after early kernel init, since then the rootdev * is available. */ static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb) { bool ro = false; /* * If load pinning is not enforced via a read-only block * device, allow sysctl to change modes for testing. */ if (mnt_sb->s_bdev) { char bdev[BDEVNAME_SIZE]; ro = bdev_read_only(mnt_sb->s_bdev); bdevname(mnt_sb->s_bdev, bdev); pr_info("%s (%u:%u): %s\n", bdev, MAJOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev), MINOR(mnt_sb->s_bdev->bd_dev), ro ? "read-only" : "writable"); } else pr_info("mnt_sb lacks block device, treating as: writable\n"); if (!ro) { if (!register_sysctl_paths(loadpin_sysctl_path, loadpin_sysctl_table)) pr_notice("sysctl registration failed!\n"); else pr_info("enforcement can be disabled.\n"); } else pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n"); } #else static void check_pinning_enforcement(struct super_block *mnt_sb) { pr_info("load pinning engaged.\n"); } #endif static void loadpin_sb_free_security(struct super_block *mnt_sb) { /* * When unmounting the filesystem we were using for load * pinning, we acknowledge the superblock release, but make sure * no other modules or firmware can be loaded. */ if (!IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) && mnt_sb == pinned_root) { pinned_root = ERR_PTR(-EIO); pr_info("umount pinned fs: refusing further loads\n"); } } static int loadpin_read_file(struct file *file, enum kernel_read_file_id id, bool contents) { struct super_block *load_root; const char *origin = kernel_read_file_id_str(id); /* * If we will not know that we'll be seeing the full contents * then we cannot trust a load will be complete and unchanged * off disk. Treat all contents=false hooks as if there were * no associated file struct. */ if (!contents) file = NULL; /* If the file id is excluded, ignore the pinning. */ if ((unsigned int)id < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id) && ignore_read_file_id[id]) { report_load(origin, file, "pinning-excluded"); return 0; } /* This handles the older init_module API that has a NULL file. */ if (!file) { if (!enforce) { report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-pinning-ignored"); return 0; } report_load(origin, NULL, "old-api-denied"); return -EPERM; } load_root = file->f_path.mnt->mnt_sb; /* First loaded module/firmware defines the root for all others. */ spin_lock(&pinned_root_spinlock); /* * pinned_root is only NULL at startup. Otherwise, it is either * a valid reference, or an ERR_PTR. */ if (!pinned_root) { pinned_root = load_root; /* * Unlock now since it's only pinned_root we care about. * In the worst case, we will (correctly) report pinning * failures before we have announced that pinning is * enforcing. This would be purely cosmetic. */ spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock); check_pinning_enforcement(pinned_root); report_load(origin, file, "pinned"); } else { spin_unlock(&pinned_root_spinlock); } if (IS_ERR_OR_NULL(pinned_root) || load_root != pinned_root) { if (unlikely(!enforce)) { report_load(origin, file, "pinning-ignored"); return 0; } report_load(origin, file, "denied"); return -EPERM; } return 0; } static int loadpin_load_data(enum kernel_load_data_id id, bool contents) { return loadpin_read_file(NULL, (enum kernel_read_file_id) id, contents); } static struct security_hook_list loadpin_hooks[] __lsm_ro_after_init = { LSM_HOOK_INIT(sb_free_security, loadpin_sb_free_security), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_read_file, loadpin_read_file), LSM_HOOK_INIT(kernel_load_data, loadpin_load_data), }; static void __init parse_exclude(void) { int i, j; char *cur; /* * Make sure all the arrays stay within expected sizes. This * is slightly weird because kernel_read_file_str[] includes * READING_MAX_ID, which isn't actually meaningful here. */ BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files) != ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id)); BUILD_BUG_ON(ARRAY_SIZE(kernel_read_file_str) < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id)); for (i = 0; i < ARRAY_SIZE(exclude_read_files); i++) { cur = exclude_read_files[i]; if (!cur) break; if (*cur == '\0') continue; for (j = 0; j < ARRAY_SIZE(ignore_read_file_id); j++) { if (strcmp(cur, kernel_read_file_str[j]) == 0) { pr_info("excluding: %s\n", kernel_read_file_str[j]); ignore_read_file_id[j] = 1; /* * Can not break, because one read_file_str * may map to more than on read_file_id. */ } } } } static int __init loadpin_init(void) { pr_info("ready to pin (currently %senforcing)\n", enforce ? "" : "not "); parse_exclude(); security_add_hooks(loadpin_hooks, ARRAY_SIZE(loadpin_hooks), "loadpin"); return 0; } DEFINE_LSM(loadpin) = { .name = "loadpin", .init = loadpin_init, }; /* Should not be mutable after boot, so not listed in sysfs (perm == 0). */ module_param(enforce, int, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(enforce, "Enforce module/firmware pinning"); module_param_array_named(exclude, exclude_read_files, charp, NULL, 0); MODULE_PARM_DESC(exclude, "Exclude pinning specific read file types"); |